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MARITIME LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY:
A STUDY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS
T RADITIONALLY, foreign limitations of shipowner's liability have been
held inapplicable in American courts.1 The courts characterize the
American limitation statute as procedural, thereby invoking the vener-
able choice-of-law rule that the lex fori governs in matters of procedure,
though foreign substantive law is used.2 The facile generality of this
rule obscures, however, a complex situation. In addition to the difficulty
of distinguishing between substance and procedure,3 the "black letter"
rule inexorably requires the specified result despite possible rational
grounds for applying foreign limitation law. Critics of this rule
generally suggest that limitations of liability are substantive rather than
procedural, and that, therefore, the lex loci should govern.4 A contro-
' Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Mellor (The Titanic), 233 U.S. 718 (1914)1
Kloeckner Rederei und Kohlenhandel, G.M.B.H. v. A/S Hakedal, zio F.zd 754 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 8o (1954). "Furthermore, on the theory that the limita-
tion law is procedural rather than substantive, so that, on received principles of the
conflict of laws, the law of the forum should govern, it has been assumed that American
courts will apply American limitation law in any limitation proceedings properly before
them." GILMORE & BLAcK, ADMIRALTY 736 (1957) [hereinafter cited as GILMORE &
BLACK]. "The limitation of liability in a maritime cause of action is determined by
the law of the forum, irrespective of the law which created the cause of action." RE-
STATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 411 (1934).
'See generally BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 411.1 (1935); GOODRICH, THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 226-28 ( 3 d ed. t949).
'Cf. Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J.
333 (1933)"
'Comment, Limitation of Shipowners' Liability: Substance or Procedure?, 17 U.
CHI. L. REV. 388, 393 (195o). "The Court's ruling [in The Titanic] on the limita-
tion point has always been a matter of some doubt. . . ." Knauth, Renvoi and Other
Conflicts Problems in Transportation Law, 49 COLUM. L. REV 1, 4 (1949); Kuhn,
International Aspects of The Titanic Case, 9 Am. J. INT'L L. 336 (1915). "[L]imita-
tion of liability should be applied as the substantive law of the locus delicti in all cases,
and in order to determine whether limitation of liability is to be granted, the petitioner
must show that by the lex loci delicti he is entitled to limitation. Then, if he is so
entitled, the statute of that jurisdiction, if proved, and not the United States Statute,
should be applied." Note, Limitation of Shipowners' Liability in American Courts, 78
U. PA. L. REV. 393, 400 (1930).
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versial 1949 Supreme Court decision arguably lends support to this
proposition.6
In recent years, a number of important decisions and commentaries
have re-examined the whole structure of choice-of-law problems." These
modern authorities suggest a new approach to the solution of choice-of-
law problems which would avoid the frequently esoteric substantive-
procedural dichotomy and instead inquire into whether the forum state
has sufficient interest in the litigation to warrant application of its law.
The traditional choice-of-law rules regarding limitation of liability
should be re-evaluated in light of this suggested method.
DEVELOPMENT OF LIMITATION LAW
The Limitation of Liability Act was first enacted in the United
States in I85I as a "Bill to limit the liability of shipowners .... 'I
The statute was not unique when enacted; such provisions, common in
other maritime countries, had put American shipping at a competitive
disadvantage.' This inequality, the hazards of ocean commerce, and
the inability of the shorebased owner to control the actions of captain
and crew while they were at sea, provided the rationale of limitation
of liability. The act currently provides in part that:
The liability of the owner of any vessel, whether American or foreign, for
any embezzlement, loss, or destruction by any person of any property, goods,
or merchandise shipped or put on board of such vessel, or for any loss, damage,
... or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or incurred, without the privity or knowl-
edge of such owner or owners, shall not, except in the cases provided for in
subsection (b) of this section [dealing with loss of life], exceed the amount or
' Black Diamond S.S. Corp. v. Robert Stewart & Sons (The Norwalk Victory), 336
U.S. 386 (.949).
* See, e.g., Bernkrant v. Fowler, - Cal. 2d -, 12 Cal. Rptr. z66, 360 P.2d 906
(1961); Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.zd 365 (1957) ;
Currie, Married Women's Contracts: 4 Study in Conflict-of-Laws Methods, z5 U. CHI.
L. REV. 227 (1958); Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58
COLUM. L. REv. 964. (1958); Ehrenzweig, Choice of Law: Current Doctrine and
"True Rules," 49 CALIF. L. REv. 240 (1961); Yntema, The Objectives of Private
International Law, 35 CAN. BAR REV. 721 (1957).
'Act of March 3, 1851 (Bill to limit the liability of shipowners and for other
purposes) ch. 43, § 3, 9 Stat. 635. This act is currently cited as Limited Liability
Act, REv. STAT. § 4283 (875), 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1958).
s GILMORE & BLACK 663-64.
Id. at 696.
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value of the interest of such owner in such vessel, and her freight. theh"
pending. 0
Before a 1936 amendment, the act had merely specified that the
owner of "any ship or vessel" might petition for limitation of liability
under its provisions.' 1 As a result, the earliest cases construing that
statute were principally concerned with whether foreign shipowners
could avail themselves of the American limitation proceeding at all,
and not with the possible application of foreign limitations in domestic
suits. As early as 1876 the Circuit Court for the Southern District of
New York in Levinson v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., 2 held that
the act was applicable to foreign vessels, simply stating that "the statute
was not in terms confined to American vessels."" Doubt as to whether
a foreign vessel involved in a collision outside the territorial waters
of the United States could petition for limitation under the act lingered, 4
however, until, in 1881, the question was presented to the Supreme
Court in The Scotland.15 That case involved a suit against a foreign
shipowner in the United States courts growing out of a collision on the
high seas between an American and a British vessel. Under such cir-
cumstances, the Court regarded the law of the forum as generally
applicable,'" and also held that the foreign respondent could avail itself
"0Limited Liability Act, REv. STAT. § 4283 (1875), 46 U.S.C. § 183(a) (958).
(Emphasis added.) Section 183 (b) provides that: "In the case of any seagoing vessel,
if the amount of the owner's liability as limited under subsection (a) of this section is
insufficient to pay all losses in full, and the portion of such amount applicable to the
payment of losses in respect of loss of life or bodily injury is less than $6o per ton
of such vessel's tonnage, such portion shall be increased to an amount equal to $6o per
ton, to be available only for the payment of losses in respect of loss of life or bodily
injury. If such portion so increased is insufficient to pay such losses in full, they shall
be paid therefrom in proportion to their respective amounts." Sections -i83(c), x83 (d),
x83(e), and x83 (f), respectively define tonnage, liability on distinct occasions, knowl-
edge of the owners, and seagoing vessels. Limited Liability Act, REV. STAT. § 4285
(187S), 46 U.S.C. § x85 (1958) deals with procedural requirements under the act.
" Act of March 3, 185x (Bill to limit the liability of shipowners and for other
purposes) ch. 43, § 3, 9 Stat. 635.
112x5 Fed. Cas. 422 (No. 8292) (C.C.N.Y. 1876).
is Id. at 423.
"
6 E.g., Churchill v. The British America, 5 Fed. Cas. 676 (No. 2715) (E.D.N.Y.
1878). "[Tihe [limitation] of the United States ... has no extra-territorial effect and
cannot be resorted to for the purpose of limiting the liability of a foreigner for a col-
lision occurring on the high seas and beyond the territorial limits of the United States."
I. at 677.
1o5 U.S. 24 (1881).
16 "If they [ships colliding on the high seas] belonged to different nations, having
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of the American limitation proceeding.17  The issue in The Scotland
was subsequently resolved by Congress in the 1936 amendment to the
act which, in broad terms, provides that any vessel "whether American
or foreign,"11 can petition for limitation under its terms.
The Court in The Scotland had further said, by way of dictum, that
"Jill a collision should occur in British waters, at least between British
ships, and the injured party should seek relief in our courts, we would
administer justice according to the British limitation law ... " This
situation was not, however, considered until 1894 in The State of
Virginia." In that case, suit was brought against British owners by
British and American underwriters for cargo lost when the vessel ran
aground in British waters. The vessel was a total loss and thus the
question was raised whether the higher British limitation law or the
lower American act should be applied.' Judge Benedict, citing no
authority, wrote: "I have given it due consideration; and my opinion
is that the extent of the liability of the shipowner, in a case like this, is
determined by the statutes of the United States, and not by the laws of
Great Britain. 22  The question was not presented to the Supreme
different laws, since it would be unjust to apply the laws of either to the exclusion
of the other, the law of the forum, that is, the maritime law as received and practiced
therein, would properly furnish the rule of decision." Id. at 30.
" "We see no reason, in the absence of any different law governing the case, why
it should not be applied to foreign ships as well as to our own, whenever the parties
choose to resort to our courts for redress." Id. at 31. The Court's indiscriminate use
of the words "parties choose" implies that the petitioner or the claimants could initiate
suit in American courts. This, of course, does not respect practicality, for the shipowner
will petition for limitation of liability in the forum the claimants have chosen. See on
the limitation point, La Bourgogne, 2io U.S. 95 (19o8); The Princess Sophia, 6x F.2d
539 (9 th Cir. 1932), Petition of Canadian Pac. Ry., 278 Fed. 18o (W.D. Wash. ig2i).
Cf. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.s. 571 (1953). "It is pointed out that our statute on
limitations of shipowner's liability which formerly applied in terms to 'any vessel' was
applied by our courts to foreign causes [citing The Scotland and The Titanic]." Id.
at s91.
" Act of June 5, 1936, ch. 52., § 4283(a), 49 Stat. 1479.
19 105 U.S. 24, 29 (zSsi). This statement was, of course, dictum, since the issue
was whether the foreign shipowner could petition for limitation of liability under the
American act.
50 6o Fed. so18 (E.D.N.Y. 1894).
' The vessel was a total loss. Therefore, only under the American act, there would
be recovery to the extent of the freight then pending. Under the British act, however,
claimants could have recovered up to £8 per ton gross registered tonnage. Master's
report, The State of Virginia, ibid.
" Ibid. This decision thus avoided a determination of whether American or British
substantive law governed other aspects of the case, since in no event could there be
recovery.
[Vol. %96z: z59
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Court until 1913 in The Titanic,3 a case rising put of the well-known
collision between the British luxury liner and an iceberg in the North
Atlantic. The owners of the vessel, seeking to limit their liability,
contended that the American, and not the British, limitation law should
govern. The district court, following the dictum in The Scotland,4
felt that such a situation required the application of British substantive
law.25 Moreover, the judge felt that Congress had not intended to
favor British shipowners by the act,26 and that British limitation law
was substantive and "affects a right.' 27 The Supreme Court, in a rather
surprising opinion, reversed. Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for a ma-
jority of the Court, held that even though British substantive law was
generally applicable, the American limitation act should apply. In
the most significant portion of the opinion he wrote:
It is true that the foundation for a recovery upon a British tort is an obliga-
tion created by British law. But it is also true that the laws of the forum may
decline altogether to enforce that obligation on the ground that it is contrary
to the domestic policy, or may decline to enforce it except within such limits
as it may impose. [Citations omitted.] It is competent, therefore, to Con-
gressto enact that, in certain matters belonging to admiralty jurisdictions,
parties resorting to our courts shall recover only to such extent or in such
way as it may mark out.28
The Court apparently felt that the American act evidenced a distinct
policy to apply the domestic law in all cases before a domestic court even
when the petitioner was a foreign shipowner2 9 It is not dear, however,
" Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Mellor, 233 U.S. 718 (1914). This decision is
commonly referred to as The Titani, and will be so referred to in this article.
"6 2o9 Fed. 5oi, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
" "In this case the collision was between the Titanic and an iceberg, but I can see
no reason for a different application of the rule [liability determined by the law of the
country to which the ships belong] in a case where a vessel is injured by collision with
some floating object belonging to no country, or where a vessel founders on the high
seas without any appreciable cause, than in the case of injuries occasioned by the col-
lision of two vessels [on the high seas] of the same nation." 2o9 Fed. Soi, 5o8-o9
(S.D.N.Y. 1913).
"' "There certainly can be no presumption that the object of Congress in passing the
. . . act limiting the liability of shipowners, was to favor British shipowners2. Id. at
510.
"7 "But the statute limiting the liabilities of shipowners is a statute which affects a
right." Id. at 5o9.
28 233 U.S. 718, 732-34 (1914). (Emphasis added.)
5
"This statute [Limited Liability Act] well might be held to announce a general
policy, governing both obligations that arise within the jurisdiction and suits that are
brought in the courts of the United States." Id. at 733. See, for similar results, Ferneau
Vol. z962: 259]
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that Congress intended to enunciate any such policy, and in fact, Mr.
Justice McKenna dissented on this point, urging that "it [is] a proper
deduction from The Scotland that the law of the foreign country should
be enforced in respect of the amount of the owner's liability. ' 0The Titanic was subsequently interpreted by the lower federal
courts to mean that foreign limitations of liability were always pro-
cedural in nature and that the American limitation should apply."1 In
reality, however, The Titanic seemed to be based primarily on public
policy considerations rather than the substantive-procedural dichotomy. 2
The interpretation adopted by the lower courts perhaps indicates a
judicial desire for predictability and a convenient formula for the
decision of cases. It may also be that the lower courts were confused
by Holmes's failure to state definitively the policy that lay behind the
decision.33
. In 1949, the Supreme Court reconsidered the question, although
not squarely, in The Norwalk Victory. 4 There, American and
British vessels collided in Belgian waters, thus in the Court's view
warranting a general application of Belgian substantive law. The cargo
owners brought suit in the Eastern District of New York against the
owners of the American vessel. The respondents petitioned for limita-
tion of liability and offered to post bond equal to the lower Belgian
v. Armour & Co., 303 S.W.2d x61 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957); Associates Discount Corp. v.
McKinney, 230 N.C. 727, 55 S.E.2d- 5 i 3 (1949); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS
§61 (1934).
so 7 3 3 U.S. 718, 734 0914)-
" In Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. v. Companhia de Navegaco Lloyd Brasileiro, 31
F.2d 757 (E.D.N.Y. 1928), a British ship had collided with a Brazilian ship in Belgian
territorial waters. The district court held that the domestic limitation act should apply
despite the general application of Belgian substantive law of proportional liability and
the lack of American interest in the controversy other than the bringing of suit in a
domestic court. Similarly, The Titanic holding was followed in The Mandu, ioz
F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1939), which involved the collision of German and Brazilian vessels
in Brazilian waters. There, the Second Circuit held that the American limitation applied
simply because "statutes permitting limitation are regarded as relating to remedy...
Id. at 463.
See text accompanying notes 27 & 28, supra.
, For example, "the laws of the forum may decline altogether to enforce that
obligation on the ground that it is contrary to the domestic policy, or may decline
to enforce it except within such limits as it may impose." 233 U.S. 718, 732 (1914).
(Emphasis added.)
"Black Diamond S.S. Co. v. Robert Stewart & Sons, 336 U.S. 386 (1949). It
should be noted that The Norwalk Victory was decided after the 1936 change of
language in the Limitation of Liability Act.
(Vol, x961: 250
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amount" in order that the vessel might be released." The district court
dismissed the respondent's petition on the ground that limitation of
liability is governed by the law of the forum and, therefore, the bond
would have to equal the amount for which petitioners would be liable
under American law.37
The Norwalk Victory thus presented the converse of The Titanic
situation, where the American limitation amount was lower than the
foreign. This distinction is the elusive key to Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
majority opinion which held that if the limitation of liability was sub-
stantive and a limitation of the right under Belgian law, it would be an
enlargement of the Belgian-created right to apply the higher American
limitation.38 .The opinion intimates that The Titanic may well have
been correct in not applying foreign limitations which were higher
than the American and which thus may have been violative of con-
gressional policy toward shipping.n In the exact language of the
majority opinion:
[W]hether [there] are in fact considerations of domestic policy which deserve
to be measured against application of the lex loci delicti and whether such
considerations are as significant where the foreign limitation is lower than our
own as where it is higher-these two are questions not now before us in view
of the fact that the case is here merely on exceptions to the petition for limita-
tion of liability. 40
The inference might be drawn from dictum and implications of
The Norwalk Victory that in an appropriate situation for application
"5 The American limitation amount was about $1,ooo,ooo in this situation, whereas
the Belgian was $325,ooo. The petitioner initially offered to post only the latter
amount. See generally GILMORE & BLACK 736.
"Limited Liability Act, REv. STAT. §4285 (1875), 46 U.S.C. § 183 (b) (1958).
For the text of this section, see note io, supra.
'"See United States v. Robert Stewart & Sons Ltd., 167 F.zd 308 (2d Cir. 1948).
" Black Diamond S.S. Corp. v. Robert Stewart & Sons, Ltd., 336 U.S. 386, 395-96
(1949).
"The exact words of the opinion are: "[I]f indeed, the Belgian limitation attaches
io the right, then nothing in The Titanic [citation omitted] stands in the way of ob-
serving that limitation." Id. at 395- It is difficult to determine whether Frank-
furter meant for this interpretation to apply only when the foreign limitation is lower
than the American, or, to the contrary, to apply whenever the foreign limitation is
substantive under the law of the creating state. The latter interpretation would seem
to fly in the face of the 1936 amendment to the act. See text accompanying note 54,
infra. The former, however, arguably has merit, at least in some situations. See text
accompanying note 61, infra.
"
0 Id. 'at 396. (Emphasis added.)
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of foreign substanti Ve law, a foreign limitation of liability will be applied
if the creating state considers it substantive, absent compelling policy
reasons to the contrary.4' Where, however, the foreign limitation is
higher than the American, then the rule of The Titanic still governs
and the American limitation will be applied. 2 The latter result is
reached regardless of whether the foreign limitation is considered as
substantive or procedural under foreign law, since according to The
Titanic the American act expresses a policy favoring shipping which
limits the liability in domestic courts to the maximum provided
for by the Limitation of Liability Act.43
As there have been no significant decisions on the point since The
Norwalk Victory4 4 the exact state of the law is somewhat uncertain,
although it may be as set forth in The Titanic and The Norwalk Victory.
Whether this is the most desirable solution to the problem is, however,
another question.
EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS
The problem of whether to apply American or foreign limitation
law to cases with domestic and foreign elements cannot adequately be
solved by the substance-procedure dichotomy.45 This system, resorted
to in The Titanic, enhances certainty and predictability on the surface
only; it does not take into account underlying considerations which
undoubtedly have an impact on the court's determination. 40  A more
'"Cf. GOODRICH, THE CONFLICr OF LAWS, § 9x, at z59 ( 3d ed. 1949). "If the
limitation [of amounts recoverable] is created by the state where the cause of action
arose, the problem is analogous to the one of damages, and the plaintiff should be barred
from recovering more no matter where suit is brought." Ibid.
"'See note 29, supra.
"' This formulation is hypothetical, and has not been recognized in the cases. It is,
moreover, subject to the doubt expressed in note 39, supra, with respect to the fashion
in which Frankfurter differentiates between The Titanic and the situation where the
limitation under the foreign law is substantive.
"A survey of the cases shows no significant decisions on point relying on either
The Titanic or The Norwalk Victory after the decision in The Norwalk Victory.
Although The Titanic and The Norwalk Victory have been subsequently cited, the
later cases are all distinguishable. See, e.g., Accinanto v. Cosmopolitan Shipping Co.,
zoo F. Supp. 826 (D.C. Md. x95i).
"'Cf. Grant v. McAuliffe, 4! Cal. zd 859, 264 P.zd 944 (953). For comment
by the judge who wrote the opinion in the Grant case, see Traynor, Is This Conflict
Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAS L. RE-. 657 (x959).
" These underlying considerations may, of course, have an effect on the label selected
by the judge. Note, Conflict of Laws: Application of Foreign Remedies, x961 DUKE
L.J. 3x6.
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desirable result would have obtained if Holmes had ascertained the gov-
ernmental policy evidenced in the Limitation of Liability Act, and then
determined whether the situation involving a foreign petitioner on the
one hand, and foreign and domestic claimants on the other, was one in
which the United States had a legitimate interest in application of that
policy.47 Though Holmes may have analyzed the problem in this
fashion, he couched the opinion in terms of "procedure" and "remedy"
thus inducing the lower courts to decide future cases without analysis
of the government's interest, or lack of it, in the pertinent situation.
The Limitation of Liability Act was passed primarily to encourage
American shipping and to place it on an equal footing with the foreign
industry.48 The congressional debates fail to reveal any other pur-
pose49 than that expressed by Senator Hamlin of Maine, who introduced
the bill:
It is an encouragement to our navigating interest all over the land. It is
removing some of those liabilities by which every man who is connected with
that interest, and is able to respond to the damages that properly belong to
him, will do so, and continue in the business.50
If then, the only purpose of the act was to protect and encourage
American shipping interests, the reasoning of The Titanic seemingly
lacks persuasiveness, insofar as it would apply the act to foreign ship-
ping interests. At best it would seem rather imaginative to reason, with-
out more, that American policy would be contravened if American
citizens were allowed to recover a greater sum from British shipowners
than the American act allows." This view is, however, myopic. The
For a good statement of the type of analysis suggested in the text, see Currie &
Lieberman, Purchase-Money Mortgages and State Laws: A Study in Conflict of Laws
Method, 196o DUKE L.J. x, at 9.
"8 See HUGHES, ADMIRALTY LAW 304 (i9Oi) i McHose, Admiralty Jurisdiction
and Limitation of Liability in Single Claim Cases, 2z CALIF. L. REV. 526 (1934). "The
statute was enacted by Congress in i85 for the purpose of encouraging shipbuilding,
the investment of money in ships and the employment of ships in commerce." Ibid.
"CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 2d Sess. 715 (1851) [covering 185o-5i].
"Id. at 713-20. [Emphasis added.]
' Judging from the congressional debates on the act, it can hardly be said that
it was originally enacted for the protection of British shipping interests. See text
accompanying note So, supra. For a critical view of The Titanic, see Kuhn, Interna-
tional Aspects of The Titanic case, 9 AM. J. IN7'L L. 336, 342 (1915). Moreover, the
mere fact that the forum may have a different statutory limitation than the foreign
is not enough, standing alone, to justify application of the local law. Herrick v.
Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., 31 Minn. 11, 16 N.W. 413 (1883); Note, Limitation
of Shipowners' Liability in American Courts, 78 U. PA. L. REV. 393, 400 (1930).
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labeling .of the act as procedural mistakenly leads foreign countries
to believe that we have no interest in their disposition of cases in-
volving American shipowners. The procedural classification also com-
pels application of American law despite a complete lack of domestic
interest in the controversy other than that the case appears before a
local court.52
Much of the doubt which surrounds The Titanic has stemmed from
the difficulty of discovering the policy Congress originally had in mind
with respect to foreign shipowners. The 1936 amendment--"American
or foreign"-- 3 should have eliminated this problem: the amendment
makes it dear that where there is a domestic interest in the litigation,
foreign shipowners are entitled to equal treatment with American
shipowners." The other alternatives available to Congress were: to
limit application of the act to American owners; to give the foreign
owner the benefit of his home limitation; or to apply the American or
foreign act whichever is more -estrictive. The first of these alternatives
would be shortsighted and would likely invite retaliation against
American shipowners in foreign courts r- The second would be too
generous, "" and the third attempts too nice a balance between domestic
and foreign interests.57 Congress avoided these difficulties by adopting
the simpler approach of treating foreign and American shipowners
equally. This policy is similar to that of the equal protection clause
of the Constitution and may have been inspired by the similaritkr be-
" See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larson, 345 U.S. 571, 591 (1953), where The Titanic
is approvingly cited without reference to The Norwalk Victory.
5 Act of June 5, 1936, ch. 521, § 4283, 49 Stat. 1479.
", This statement is qualified by the caveat that there must be a domestic interest.
Otherwise, there would be no reason for applying domestic law. Where there is such an
interest, however, Congress has prescribed an equal treatment policy. Cf. Currie &
Schretei, Unrconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict-of-Laws: Equal Protection, 28
U. CHI. L. REy. i, 11-29 (196o).
"It would have been possible for Congress to enact that American, and only
American, shipowners could petition for liability in a domestic forum. Such legislation
would have provided claimants unlimited recovery in suits against foreign shipowners,
but limited recovery against American owners. Such discrimination would invite re-
taliation by foreign governments. See id. at 22.
"8 This alternative would, at least in some cases, give foreign owners an advantage
over American. This was the very thing Congress originally set out to prevent
in the original act. See nn. 48 & 49, supra.
" The vice of this alternative rests in the complicated manner in which it attempts
to- solve an essentially simple problem. The solution selected by Congress is better,
but only -because it is simpler and more consistent.
[Vol. 1962: Z59
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tween the nature of the shipping industry and trade between federated
political unitsYs
With congressional policy thus defined, there are four possible mixed
party situations in which a choice of limitation law problem may arise:
(i) all parties domestic;
(2) domestic shipowner, foreign claimant;
(3) foreign shipowner, domestic claimant;59
(4) all parties foreign.
American policy is dear in the first two situations. When all the
parties are American, domestic law should be applied, for Congress
has expressly subordinated these claimants' interests to that of the ship-
owner. This is true despite the locality of the incident giving rise to
the liability, for Congress could hardly have intended to protect
American shipowners only when they are in domestic or international
waters.60 Domestic law should also be applied where the shipowner,
but not the claimant, is American. The domestic interest here is to
see that the American owner is given the protection contemplated in
the act. This was the situation in The Norwalk Victory, where Frank-
furter intimated that in certain cases the foreign limitation law might
be applied if it were lower than the American, and in addition, "attached
to the right."61  The argument could be made that the policy of the
American act would best be carried out if the limitation providing for
lower liability were to be applied. Yet this would seem shortsighted.
The application of the lower foreign limitation in this situation dis-
criminates against the foreign claimant. This is evident when it is con-
sidered that if the claimant also had been American, the higher domestic
limitation probably would have been applied.
When the shipowner is foreign, but the claimants domestic, as in the
" Cf. Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discriminaiton in the Conflict-of-Laws:
Equal Protection, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. i, 22 (196o).
"8 This situation is likely to be varied by the presence of both foreign and domestic
claimants in a proceeding initiated by a foreign shipowner. See text accompanying note
66, infra.
"0Cf. Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 0957)-
Congress was not so much concerned with where the incident happened, as distinguished
from to whom it happened, because their motive was to protect shipowners. It would
be difficult to devise any theory which would significantly relate to where the incident
occurred. See Currie, Married Wometes Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws
Methods, 25 U..CHI. L. REV. -27, 23-6. (z958). See -also text accompanying note 4,
supra. ....
" Black Diamond S.S. Co. v. Robert Stewart & Sons (The Norwalk Victory), 336
U.s. 386 (949). See note 39, suPra.
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third situation, the policy in favor of applying domestic law is also dear.
The 1936 amendment shows that Congress intended to treat foreign
shipowners equally with American, and this is equally true when appli-
cation of American law would be detrimental to the foreign owner. 2
Moreover, the Limitation of Liability Act is the result of balancing of
interests and it would be senseless to argue that Congress had no in-
tention of protecting domestic claimants. Since the foreign shipowner
would seek to have his liability limited under the foreign act only when
it would result in less recovery for the claimant, application of the
foreign law would subordinate the interest of the domestic claimant
to a greater degree than Congress intended. 3
When all the parties are foreign, there is no legitimate domestic
interest in the controversy and therefore no justification for application
of local law per se."' It is in fact possible that the American policy
would be to apply the foreign limitation law, for in the opposite case-
all parties American, foreign forum-it would be our hope that Ameri-
can law would be applied. The foreign shipowner will not be dis-
criminated against, because he is being treated exactly as he would
have been in his home forum. This analysis is, of course, subject to
the qualification that the domestic court will apply its own rules and
practices to the extent it would be inconvenient or impractical to do
otherwise."3
For simplicity, the discussion to this point has assumed that all of
the claimants were either American or foreign. In practice, however,
many situations will arise where both American and foreign claimants
will seek to participate in the limitation fund. 0 If the shipowner is
American, then the varied nationalities of the claimants is not relevant076
it is only where the shipowner is foreign that a problem is raised. In
the latter situation, there is no difficulty as to the law to be applied to
the American claimants i the policy of the limitation law calls for the
"' Cf. Currie & Schreter, supra note 58, at 27.
e8 See Currie, supra note 6o, at 234.
0& id. at 240.
"'In an excellent article, Professor Cook suggests the following test to determine
what domestic law should be applied despite general application of foreign law: "How
far can the court go in applying the rules taken from the foreign system of law without
unduly hindering or inconveniencing itself?" Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in
the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333 344 (1933).
"6 For example, in the 4ndrea Doria-Stockholm collision, Time, Aug. 6, 1956, p. 12,
both of the vessels were foreign, yet there were many American claimants. See note 59,
supra.
*7 See text accompanying note 61, supra.
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application of domestic law.6" There is no such interest in applying
domestic law to the foreign claimants. 69  This dilemma might be re-
solved by applying domestic law to domestic claimants, and foreign law
to foreign claimants. One difficulty with this approach is the possi-
bility of double liability on the part of the shipowner. 0 Another, and
perhaps more serious difficulty, would be the practical problem of de-
vising a fair and manageable system of administering separate trials.
An alternative to splitting would be to decide that it would be too
complicated, inconvenient and time consuming 1 to attempt the applica-
tion of foreign limitations to those claimants in whom there is no
domestic interest, and accordingly apply American law by default.
CONCLUSION
It is illusory to believe that the substance-procedure dichotomy is
the best method of solving the problem of what limitation law to apply
where foreign and domestic parties are involved. The governmental
interest method of analysis, which rejects the niceties of the traditional
"black letter" rule, is a sounder approach. By use of this method, the
Limitation of Liability Act is given maximum effectiveness in attaining
its avowed purpose of protecting American shipowners where there is a
legitimate domestic interest in the litigation.
See text accompanying note 63, supra.
e' See text accompanying note 64, supra.
o The prospect of multiple liability did not seem to concern Justice Holmes in
The Titanic: "We see no absurdity in supposing that if the owner of the Titanic were
sued in different countries, each having a different rule regarding the remedy there, the
local rule should be applied in each case." 233 U.S. 718, 734 (1914). However, this
case was decided before the 1936 amendments to the act, which clarified American
policy as being one of nondiscrimination.
To overcome the possibility of multiple recovery would not be easy. To illustrate,
a simple case will be assumed: a vessel sank with complete loss of life. This incident
happened after the Morro Castle amendments to the Limited Liability Act were
enacted, 49 Stat. 960 (1935), 46 U.S.C. § x8 3 (b) (r958), providing that culpable
shipowners would be liable for loss of life or personal injury in an amount equal to
$60 per ton, even if the vessel were a total loss. If there were zoo claimants, lo of
whom were domestic, and a io,ooo ton vessel, it would be possible-if these were
the only claims--to devise an algebraic formula to accomplish equivalence. For ex-
ample, x/xoth of io,ooo or s,ooo tons could be made available for satisfaction of the
shipowner's liability to the domestic claimants. If, in addition to the death claims, there
were also cargo claims, salvage, claims by other vessels, etc., a special master could
be appointed to make the necessary calculations. It seems apparent, however, that there
is a point of diminishing returns involved here. It may well be that the difficulty of
Ending a convenient method of dealing with this situation is sufficient justification for
applying local law. The courts of the forum have an interest, it would seem, in the
expeditious settlement of claims.
"
1 See the comments by Professor Cook, note 65, supra.
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